Israel's Early Elections: Reasons and Ramifications

American Jewish Committee
Tuesday, 5 January 1999

In the aftermath of the Wye Memorandum of October 1998, the Netanyahu government found it increasingly difficult to sustain a consistent parliamentary majority in the Knesset. By December it became clear that a vote of no confidence would soon topple the government. Prime Minister Netanyahu, reconciled to the inevitability of new elections, negotiated an election date with opposition leader Ehud Barak: May 17, 1999, with a second round in the prime minis-terial elections (if needed) set for June 1. This briefing describes the reasons for the govern-ment's fall, offers a preliminary look at the issues, candidates and parties involved in the elec-tions, and assesses the ramifications: for politics in Israel, for "Who is a Jew" issues, and for the peace process.

Why the Government Lost its Majority

From its inception, the Netanyahu government confronted a structural-political contradiction with regard to its most demanding task: the Oslo process. On the one hand, Netanyahu had committed himself and the Likud Party he heads to continue the process, albeit more cautiously and with the goal of extracting a greater security commitment from the Palestinians and reducing Israel's territorial concessions. On the other hand, the Prime Minister himself, along with key parties in his coalition, remained loyal to the Land of Israel ideal, which claims all the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean for Israel and supports the settlement movement in the West Bank and Gaza.

Much of Netanyahu's two and half years in office were consumed by his maneuvering, usually with considerable tactical political skill, in the grey area between these alternate visions. Thus he succeeded in executing the withdrawal from Hebron in January 1997 with sweeping Knesset support and without losing the right wing of his coalition. But within two months he commenced housing construction in East Jerusalem and offered a small and controversial territorial increment for the first further redeployment. His Palestinian partner in the process, sensing a contradiction and questioning Netanyahu's motives, refused to negotiate with him directly, stepped up efforts in international organizations and world capitals to put political pressure on the Israeli government, and curtailed Palestinian security cooperation with Israel. As the demands of the peace process grew - turning over more territory, reducing settlement activity, cooperating with American mediation efforts that Netanyahu himself had requested in view of his inability to negotiate directly with the PLO - the Prime Minister's actions were increasingly interpreted across the Israeli political spectrum (as well as in Washington and Arab capitals) as indications of inadequate leadership and compromised credibility in the political and diplomatic spheres.

After Wye, Netanyahu was barely able to produce a Cabinet plurality in favor of turning over the first territorial increment. It became increasingly evident that the second and third increments did not enjoy the support of his government. Typically, the Prime Minister reacted by toughening his own judgment of the Palestinian Authority's compliance with its commitments under the agreement, and seeking to reduce Israel's concessions (e.g., regarding prisoner release), in the hope that this would slow down the agreement and/or enhance its image in the eyes of the political right. The United States, which by now had become the referee or arbiter of Wye, endorsed some but by no means all of Netanyahu's positions, and insisted on maintaining its own commitments, most prominently in the form of a Clinton visit to Gaza. Netanyahu's ambivalence toward this visit, which Israel had itself proposed and endorsed, weakened his support on the left wing of his coalition (The Third Way), while his shifts in position further distanced his right wing (the NRP and some in his own party, the Likud).

By mid-December the government's loss of a majority was so apparent that it could not pass budgetary appropriations bills, and a bill to dissolve the Knesset passed on the first reading. Veteran Likud stalwarts like Benny Begin and Dan Meridor - who for months had criticized Netanyahu but had abstained in key votes - now turned openly against the Prime Minister. In a key Knesset debate on December 21, the Prime Minister was jeered by many in his own party. There was no longer an alternative to elections.

Why May 17?

Israel's electoral laws provide a number of ways of dissolving the government and/or initiating early elections. A no-confidence vote, for example, precipitates elections within 60 days. Opposition leader Barak could have sought such a quick election to take advantage of Netanyahu's predicament and the disarray within Likud ranks. Netanyahu, on the other hand, ostensibly favored postponing elections for as long as possible, in order to give him time to improve the economic situation. Ultimately, four external factors influenced the selection of May 17 and the determination that Israel would now undergo a five-month electoral process.

First, April 1999 is a month of Jewish and Israeli national holidays and memorial days; elections must either precede or follow April. Secondly, both Netanyahu and Barak are threatened by the emergence of a major third party candidate (see below), retiring IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, who leads them both in the polls. Shahak is untested politically, and his current popularity appears to derive from his projection of a credible "non-politician" image and his lack of exposure to close public scrutiny. A long electoral campaign, in which Shahak has to enunciate views on controversial issues and "dirty his hands" politically, is considered likely to detract from his popularity, hence is desirable on the part of both Netanyahu and Barak. Third, election commission officials warned that, despite the provisions of the election law, 60 days were insufficient notice to organize elections without encountering irregularities and disruptions. Finally, in order for Barak to ignore Netanyahu's wishes and campaign for earlier elections he would have to recruit a constant majority of 61 Knesset members and lead them through a parliamentary labyrinth. While this is feasible, it was believed likely to take so much time that in any case the parties might arrive at a May date.

A Flood of Candidates

The events of December proved that, under the new system with its provision of near presidential powers to the Prime Minister, a government can nevertheless be brought down. The ensuing events at the party political level have reinforced the impression, based until now on the 1996 Knesset elections, that the "split ballot" system (one vote for Prime Minister, another for Knesset list) is fragmenting the Israeli political scene and degrading the traditional party structure almost beyond manageability.

In the 1996 elections voters felt free to select one of the prime ministerial candidates from the two main parties, Likud and Labor, then abandon those parties and vote for smaller, sectarian or single-issue parties for the Knesset. The result was a sharp decline in Likud and Labor's combined representation, and the proliferation of small and medium-sized parties whose main interest is to satisfy the economic, religious or political needs of a relatively small sector of the population. This made it difficult for Netanyahu to form and manage a coherent coalition; his own party, the Likud (without its Gesher and Tsomet partners), constituted only one-third of the ruling coalition.

Now the new system has "opened up" the prime ministerial scene as well. Whereas in 1996 there were only two candidates, Netanyahu and Peres, the past week has witnessed the emergence of at least seven declared candidates - with more likely. This virtually guarantees that no one will achieve over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, and mandates a runoff between the two leading vote-getters. At this point in time, no candidate, including Barak and Netanyahu, can be certain that he will participate in the runoff. Within the Likud a number of key personalities have abandoned Netanyahu and the party, oppose him within the party, or are weighing one of these steps. Beyond the Likud, the multiplicity of candidates appears to reflect an additional fragmentation of the system. These phenomena have added impetus to a bilateral effort in the Knesset to cancel the reforms and revert to the old, party-list single ballot system. But even if this succeeds it is very likely that the 1999 elections will still adhere to the new system, and that the next Knesset will be even more fragmented and unmanageable than the outgoing one.

At this very early phase in the unfolding campaign, a number of observations may be presented regarding the principal declared candidates:

Netanyahu's appeals to the public focus first and foremost on Yasir Arafat - blaming him for the stalemate in the peace process. Netanyahu has labeled his principal rivals - Barak, Shahak and Meridor - "lefties," who will return to the ways of Rabin and Peres and turn over land to the Palestinians while terrorism rages in the streets. He is appealing to a hard core of support among sectors of the public who identify with his antipathy toward the "old elites": the media, the Ashkenazi establishment, even the judicial and security establishments.

Barak is seeking to break free of the traditional Labor mold, with its left wing, Ashkenazi profile, by setting up "One Israel," a movement that would embody Labor as well as additional sectors. In this connection he is wooing David Levy and his Gesher Party, as well as Minister of Defense Yitzhak Mordechai - one of the Likud ministers (the other is Limor Livnat) who have indicated their displeasure with Netanyahu and are weighing their course for the future. Barak's early campaign appeals focus mainly on Netanyahu's alleged failures in the social, economic and health fields, along with his alleged lack of suitability for high office. Barak has conspicuously avoided criticizing Netanyahu's tough stance toward Arafat, apparently because his own polling indicates that this is a popular position.

Amnon Lipkin-Shahak is about to declare his candidacy. He hastened his discharge from the IDF in order to qualify. He is recruiting support for a center party from disgruntled elements within Labor and Likud, as well as from smaller centrist bodies like The Third Way and the liberal orthodox Meimad. At this stage, Shahak's candidacy reflects his own charisma as well as a traditional longing in Israeli politics for unity, and the sense that a centrist Prime Minister could be the prime mover in forming a unity government. While avoiding policy pronouncements thus far, Shahak has made clear that the desire to remove Netanyahu is a primary motivation for his entry into politics. But his political persona and electability remain unknown quantities.

Dan Meridor has declared his candidacy and his intention to form a centrist Knesset list. Meridor, the most experienced politician of all the candidates, resigned from the Ministry of Finance after serving in the Netanyahu government for a year. His decision to contest the election outside the Likud apparently reflects his assessment that Netanyahu has too firm a grip on the party apparatus to be dislodged from within. Meridor has a reputation on the right and the left for integrity, fair-dealing and support for civil rights: he is the principal architect of the Basic Laws regarding civil and human rights in Israel. In recent years he has softened his views on territorial compromise and a Palestinian state. It is generally assumed that Meridor and Shahak will combine forces. But it remains to be seen how, and when, they will determine which of the two has the best chance, and which should step aside and become No. 2 on the list.

Roni Milo, former Likud mayor of Tel Aviv, declared his candidacy fully a year ago. He is also seen as a centrist, though dovish on peace and territory issues. It is believed likely that he will join forces with Meridor and Shahak.

Benny Begin, who resigned his ministerial position even before Meridor, is seeking to rally all the political forces to the right of Netanyahu behind his candidacy, which is based on the Land of Israel principle, coupled with an attack on Netanyahu's suitability for office. He will be competing with Netanyahu for the allegiance of no more than one quarter of the electorate on the far right. At this point the main effect of his candidacy will likely be to divert right wing support away from Netanyahu.

Uzi Landau, another Likud hawk, is running against Netanyahu for the nomination within the Likud. Since he has virtually conceded that he will lose, the main thrust of his candidacy appears to be to position himself to contest the Likud leadership if Netanyahu loses the election.

Rafael Eitan, leader of the Tsomet Party (currently part of the Likud Knesset faction) and also a hawk, has declared he will run. Eitan will compete with Begin and Netanyahu for the right wing ideological vote, but is not considered to have significant electoral potential.

Ariel Sharon has declared that under certain circumstances he might run for Prime Minister. In recent months Sharon has become the dominant figure in the Netanyahu government. A defection by him might have serious consequences for the Netanyahu candidacy.

Beyond the key personality issues - in essence, who looks and sounds better on televi-sion - that characterize any direct election for high office, the main issues pressed by Netanyahu's rivals are likely to be his suitability for office and Israel's social and economic situation. The peace process - in many ways the issue that precipitated these early elections - is problematic for Netanyahu's detractors. For one, his tough stance is relatively popular. Then too, there is a growing similarity among the views of all the candidates except Begin: they all explicitly or implicitly endorse a territories-for-peace solution and acknowledge the inevitability of a Palestinian state; and nearly all recognize that the key to solving Israel's problems in Leba-non is territorial negotiations with Syria.

One political observer - and participant - whose acumen is by now legendary, Aryeh Der'i, leader of the Shas Party, summed up his view of the prime ministerial race thus far as fol-lows: "Shahak doesn't have the fire in the belly but he has the ability to get elected. Barak and Bibi [Netanyahu] have the fire in the belly, but it's not certain they also have the ability to get elected. Ehud Olmert [the Likud Mayor of Jerusalem who decided not to oppose Netanyahu within the Likud] has both the fire and the ability to win. Dan Meridor and Yitzhak Mordechai have neither the fire nor the ability to win." (Yediot Ahronot, January 1, 1999)

In addition, the certain emergence of at least one relatively strong new centrist list has led many observers to recall the events of 20 years ago. In 1977 "Dash," a centrist list composed of party fragments and political adventurers led by retired IDF Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin, broke the elections wide open, helped usher in the Begin era, then disintegrated into splinter factions within the Knesset, with Yadin's image rapidly transformed from that of a potential de Gaulle to that of lackluster political novice. Will Shahak suffer the same fate? Even the election date - May 17, 1977, was the day of Begin's, and Dash's, triumph - conjures up visions of a political upset but a centrist failure.

The biggest difference this time is the system: direct election of the Prime Minister ap-pears to favor additional candidates and medium-sized parties, and to work to the detriment of large established parties. Thus Shas (the Sephardic Ultra-Orthodox party) is expected to con-tinue to grow in these elections, while the Russian immigrant vote has generated another new party, formed by Avigdor Lieberman, a close associate of Netanyahu's, that will compete with Natan Sharansky's Yisrael b'Aliya Party. Even regional parties are reportedly forming. How these developments will affect the fortunes of the candidates for Prime Minister remains to be seen.

The Extended Election Period: 'Who is a Jew' Reemerges in the Knesset

The current, "lame duck" Knesset will continue to function until it recesses, probably in mid-February, for the elections. The Cabinet will continue to be fully empowered until elec-tions. But it has already been degraded by the resignation of Finance Minister Yaakov Neeman, another disaffected Netanyahu intimate, and may witness additional resignations in the coming days by politicians who seek to take their distance from Netanyahu. This could leave extraordi-nary power in Netanyahu's hands until June.

The Knesset currently faces the urgent need to pass a budget. Since January 1, 1999, the country has been without an approved budget for the first time in its history, brought on by the government's growing dysfunction during December. It seems fairly certain that the necessary compromises will eventually be made, if only to pass a temporary budget and prevent economic and administrative chaos. But at the time of writing the religious parties were holding the budget hostage to their demand to push through long-delayed and highly controversial legislation on "Who is a Jew" issues. This development appeared to be increasingly characteristic of the par-liamentary spectrum in general, as coalition/opposition discipline has broken down and yielded to raw electoral concerns. The religious parties are pushing this sectarian legislation in order to please their constituents and to set a price for party - or even individual - support for one or another prime ministerial candidate.

The "Who is a Jew" issues are of particular concern to the Diaspora. The religious par-ties in the Knesset have revived the long-dormant conversion law, and are pushing a Religious Councils law. Both are designed to neutralize recent High Court decisions that recognize the status of Reform and Conservative rabbis and conversions in Israel. In contrast, a Basic Law on Freedom of Religion is also being readied. The fate of these legislative initiatives will be played out in the coming weeks:

- The conversion law passed on its first reading more than a year and a half ago. It rec-ognizes only conversions in Israel carried out by Orthodox rabbis. The uproar that it generated among the American Jewish community helped freeze the bill in committee, and led to the crea-tion of the Neeman Commission. One proposal being considered by the bill's religious sponsors is to incorporate into it (for the second and third reading) the Neeman Commission's main rec-ommendation: to establish conversion institutes, manned by rabbis from all three main currents of Judaism, with final approval for conversions being given by the Israeli (Orthodox) Chief Rab-binate. The Israeli Reform and Conservative movements, which participated in the Neeman Commission deliberations, reject this compromise because the Chief Rabbinate has refused to endorse the Commission's recommendations - i.e., in effect it has refused to undertake in ad-vance to approve the conversion institutes' conversions. (Meanwhile the first conversion insti-tutes are being established, with government and Jewish Agency funding.) The supporters of the more extreme, original version of the Conversion Law have redoubled their efforts since a late December intermediate court ruling that has legalized non-Orthodox conversions in Israel. More High Court rulings on the conversion issue are in the offing in coming months.

- The Religious Councils law passed its first reading in late December. It is designed to neutralize High Court rulings that have already mandated the seating of Reform and Conserva-tive rabbis in municipal religious councils. The new law calls for members of the councils in ef-fect to pledge allegiance to the Chief Rabbinate. Israel's Reform and Conservative leaders sur-prised the bill's Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sponsors by announcing that their representatives would comply with the language of the new law (if enacted), thereby in effect neutralizing it.

- A number of secular and moderate Orthodox MKs are planning to exploit the current temporary fluidity in Knesset voting and attempt to push through, at least in a preliminary read-ing, a liberal Basic Law on Freedom of Religion that would recognize the Reform and Conser-vative movements and institutionalize civil marriage in Israel.

The Extended Election Period: Stalemate in the Peace Process

The election period interacts with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process on two levels: the interim process and final status. At the interim level, Prime Minister Netanyahu has frozen the process after carrying out only the first of three scheduled transfers of West Bank territory (together constituting the second further redeployment) mandated by the Oslo II Agreement and the Wye Memorandum. He cites Palestinian non-compliance with Wye as justification for this step, claiming breaches of Palestinian pledges to control incitement to violence, confiscate illegal weapons, and reduce armed forces, and pointing to the threat of unilateral action implicit in calls to declare Palestinian statehood on May 4, 1999. At the same time, Israeli settlement expansion projects continue, and controversial housing construction in East Jerusalem is likely to be renewed.

Both the PLO and the U.S. State Department have disputed Netanyahu's interpretation and call for the withdrawals to proceed. They claim, for example, that the Israeli demand that the PLO abandon even its intention of declaring independence in May constitutes a new condi-tion, and that the demand for complete PLO collection of all illegal weapons as a condition for Israel carrying out the second increment of withdrawal (scheduled for Dec. 19) distorts the agreement, which stipulated a full 12-week period for that collection, ending in late January. American envoys are likely to seek to explore ways to maintain some minimal momentum of the Wye process during the months ahead. But electoral considerations are likely to persuade Netanyahu to maintain the freeze.

This bespeaks the possibility of Palestinian protest initiatives. An appeal to the UN Secu-rity Council is already in the works. Of greater concern is the likelihood of violence. The Fatah Movement is reportedly readying a "settlements intifada" - low-level violent protests against settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority is reportedly acutely aware of the need to prevent suicide bombings inside Israel during the election period, lest this strengthen the Israeli right, as it did in the 1996 elections. The PLO will likely encourage Israeli Arabs to vote for Barak or Shahak.

Palestinian sensitivity to Israeli election considerations is also likely to affect Chairman Arafat's much-trumpeted plan of UDI (unilateral declaration of independence) on May 4, the day the Oslo interim accords are scheduled to end. Arafat and his lieutenants have gone out on a limb in pushing their UDI agenda, and are wary lest Hamas profit from any indication of weak-ness on their part. Arafat can legitimately argue that his May 4 UDI plan has brought him con-siderable political profit thus far: it was a key factor both in bringing the parties to Wye and in precipitating early elections in Israel. But there is also increasing awareness in the PLO that UDI will encourage hawkish tendencies among the Israeli public, hence aid Netanyahu, who is hardly its preferred candidate. The United States, Egypt and the Israeli left are all seeking to dissuade Arafat. Some sort of Palestinian compromise involving postponement or a diluted form of largely declaratory independence seems likely.

Another area of peace process stalemate that could erupt and affect elections is Lebanon. After nearly three years of a freeze in negotiations Syria continues to encourage Hezbollah guerrilla activity against Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli public outcry over IDF losses prompted the government to consider radical solutions, including unilateral withdrawal (which it rejected). Most recently, a decision was taken to retaliate against the Lebanese civilian infrastructure if further katyusha rocket attacks are carried out against Northern Israel. This sets the scene for possible escalation that could prove reminiscent of Operation Grapes of Wrath, which contributed to Shimon Peres's electoral loss in 1996.

Additional external developments that could affect both the peace process and Israel's elections center on Washington. Assuming President Clinton survives the impeachment trial in the Senate, he could conceivably opt for political activism in the foreign policy sphere, including the Middle East, as a means of restoring the momentum and historical relevancy of his presi-dency. It is generally agreed that Clinton's undisguised preference for Shimon Peres worked to Netanyahu's advantage in the 1996 elections. But the United States now has a contractual obli-gation to pursue implementation of the Wye Memorandum, and the PLO is pressing it to pres-sure Netanyahu. Moreover, Israel's election period poses a danger of deterioration of the peace process. Hence it may be vital for the health of the process that Washington endeavor at least to prevent erosion during the long election period and until a new Israeli government resumes ne-gotiations (probably not before July 1999). Still, any American pressure on Israel during the elections could affect the fortunes of the campaign. American action of a different sort - the always-possible renewal of bombing of Iraq - could also have political impact if it generated new waves of anti-American and anti-Israeli protest among Palestinians and the Arab world gen-erally, or if, in the worst case, it led to a second Iraqi attack against Israel.

Conclusion

As in most elections involving incumbents, the central question that will dominate this year's contest is, "Should Netanyahu be reelected?" To a considerable extent the election will focus on the Prime Minister's defense of his record, his attacks on his opponents across the political spectrum for having sabotaged his premiership, and their attacks on his character and his style of governing. Whoever triumphs, there is a higher than usual likelihood that the winner will attempt to set up a government of national unity dedicated to advancing the peace process on the basis of a fairly broad consensus, and composed of Likud, Labor and one or more center parties. Yet, by that time, all of them together may no longer have a majority in the Knesset. Meanwhile, until these elections are decided, the peace process will likely be pushed to the back burner.

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