Report Highlights Continued Russian Assistance To Iran's Weapons Program

American Jewish Committee
Thursday, 21 May 1998

Calls For More Dynamic U.S. Policy To Curtail Dangerous Trade

As proof builds, and Western anxiety increases, that Tehran is on the verge of testing ballistic missiles and may have nuclear weapons potential within five years, how should the United States respond to Russia's continuing nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran? Economic sanctions? Diplomatic pressure? A new American Jewish Committee report examines these and other questions surrounding dangerous developments in the Middle East.

"Current American policy has failed to alter Russian attitudes toward nuclear cooperation with Iran," says Dr. Scott Parrish, a postdoctoral research fellow at Monterey's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and author of the just-released AJCommittee report, "The Russian Connection: Russia, Iran, and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction."

"American policy with respect to Russian-Iranian nuclear and missile cooperation needs to be modified to include both bigger 'sticks' and bigger 'carrots.' Only a more dynamic mix of incentives and disincentives will be sufficient to address the current situation."

In the foreword to the AJC report, Jason Isaacson, AJC Director of Government and International Affairs, and Barry Jacobs, AJC's Assistant Director for International Affairs, stress that "the transfer of Russian defense and dual-use technology to Iran poses potential danger to a wide array of U.S. interests and allies. The revolutionary regime in Tehran, with a history of bullying its moderate Arab neighbors and fomenting subversion, is already a destabilizing force in the energy-rich Middle East; its regular expressions of extreme hostility toward Israel, its longtime financial and political support of Hizbollah and other terrorist groups, and its undiminished opposition to the U.S. presence in the Gulf raise profound concerns about any possible enhancement of its military capabilities."

Dr. Parrish argues that while the Clinton Administration calls nonproliferation policy "the overriding security interest of our time," the U.S. is balancing nonproliferation against other political objectives. In the case of Russian cooperation with Iran, he notes that the U.S. is "apparently unwilling to risk damaging political ties with Russia over nonproliferation issues."

To date, the Clinton Administration has pursued a policy of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to persuade Russia to stop transferring nuclear and weapons assistance and technology to Iran. As Mr. Isaacson and Mr. Jacobs assert, and as the AJC report confirms, "Russian entities continue to provide these dangerous technologies to Tehran." To date, American policy "has been a failure."

In its executive summary, the AJC report states: "Russia's 1995 decision to build a nuclear power reactor in Iran, and persistent reports during 1997 that Russian firms are aiding Iran's ballistic missile program, raise troubling questions about the solidity of Russian nonproliferation commitments and the ability of the government to implement them….In March 1998, Russia's own press carried accounts of Russian missile specialists working in Iran. In addition, recently-released details of the illegal shipment of Russian missile guidance components to Iraq in 1995 indicate that Russian government officials have probably been involved in missile technology deals with Iran.

"Given the threat to American and global security by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, the failure of current American policy toward Russian nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran needs to be addressed in a timely fashion….American and Israeli intelligence now believe that Iran will test a prototype medium-range ballistic missile capable of delivering WMD warheads to a range of 1,000 miles by the end of 1999."

The AJC report is divided into four sections: current Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and its proliferation consequences; charges regarding Russian firms, possibly with the assistance of the Russian government, aiding Iran's ballistic missile program; a review of Russia's conventional arms transfers to Iran; and U.S. policy options to limit Russian-Iranian cooperation and to minimize the proliferation threat posed by Iran.

The American Jewish Committee first examined the potential dangers of Iran's relations with Russia and other global powers in its September 1995 report, "Business As Usual? Western Policy Options Toward Iran," prepared by Dr. Patrick Clawson of the National Defense University; an updated edition was published in June 1997. AJC undertook a closer study of Iran's weapons programs in a June 1997 brief, "Chinese Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Implications for the United States, Israel, and the Middle East." In January 1998, AJC issued a companion, and more comprehensive study, "Silkworms and Summitry: Chinese Arms Exports to Iran and U.S. - China Relations," by Dr. Bill Gates, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

For more information, or to contact American Jewish Committee, see their website at: www.ajc.org