A Decisive Juncture for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and the American Mediation Effort

American Jewish Committee
Thursday, 9 April 1998

Late in the evening of March 30, 1998, U.S. envoy Dennis Ross announced he would return from Israel to the United States, having failed to persuade Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept the American "ideas" for implementation of the second further redeployment (FRD) from the West Bank. In Washington that day, State Department spokesman James Rubin stated that the peace talks were in "dire straits." The impression of an impasse was highlighted by prior American warnings that failure to accept the American ideas would provoke an American withdrawal from involvement in the process, and/or publication of the American ideas -- in effect, the public presentation of an American plan for interim peace arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians that had been rejected by Israel. On the other hand, Secretary of State Albright, along with Israeli government spokespersons, acknowledged the next day that "some progress" had been made.

This briefing explores, on a preliminary basis, the backdrop to these developments and their ramifications for the peace process and for Israeli-American relations.

The American Role

The current intensive American role in the Israeli-Palestinian process began in October 1996. In the aftermath of the "tunnel incident" in Jerusalem and the ensuing bloodshed, the United States escalated its involvement from that of facilitator to mediator. Three and a half months later, U.S. efforts helped produce the Hebron agreement, in which the two sides committed to a new set of dates for carrying out FRDs and entering final status talks. Secretary of State Christopher offered American guarantees to each side, in so-called "Notes for the Record," that the other would follow through on its commitments "in a cooperative spirit and on the basis of reciprocity." An explanatory letter by then-U.S. Ambassador Martin Indyk to Israeli Cabinet Secretary Danny Naveh emphasized that the degrees of redeployment were Israel's prerogative alone. The Secretary's "Note" to Netanyahu said "all three phases of the further redeployments should be completed ... not later than mid-1998;" it also stressed that the Palestinian Authority bore a "major responsibility" for ensuring "public order and internal security" in the West Bank and Gaza as "a critical foundation for completing implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as the peace process as a whole."

Since January 1997, U.S. attempts to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians have been carried out in the context of these guarantees. In March 1997, an Israeli offer of a small first FRD (less than 3 percent of Area C, the area under Israeli control to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority) was rejected angrily by the Palestinians, and the renewal of final status talks was turned down by the Palestinians due to Israeli building at Har Homa in Jerusalem. During the past year, discussions of interim measures, like the opening of a Palestinian airport, have repeatedly stalled. The parties offer conflicting explanations: Israelis maintain that agreements on the airport and related issues have been at hand for months, but that Arafat has blocked their finalization -- as he has barred one-on-one negotiations with Israel, absent foreign intermediaries -- to elevate tensions and maximize pressure on Netanyahu. Palestinians say substantive negotiating differences remain on the airport and other issues; they assert a reluctance to conclude agreements that can be "used" by Israel politically to prove that an ailing peace process is healthier than it is. As the atmosphere has deteriorated and the threat of total collapse of the process has loomed ever larger, Washington has, in the course of the past six months, crystallized a set of ideas for breaking the impasse.

According to press reports, these call for the second FRD (which would now comprise the abortive first FRD) to involve the transfer of 13.1 percent of Area C to the Palestinians -- mostly to Area B, where the Palestinians have civilian but not security control. In addition, 12 percent of Area B would become Area A (under Palestinian civilian and security control). These territorial transfers would take three months, and would be carried out in three stages. In return, the Palestinians would comply with previous commitments in security and other fields wherein, according to Israel, the Palestinian Authority was in violation of the Oslo and Hebron accords: prevention of incitement against Israel, cessation of the "revolving door" practice of releasing Palestinian terrorists, investigation of arms smuggling allegations, discussion of extradition arrangements, and approval of revisions in the Palestinian Covenant.

As part of its package of "ideas," the U.S. also offered a renewed commitment of its own to the Oslo II provision for a third FRD, called for a "time out" in further Israeli settlement activity, and sought to set an early date for renewing final status talks. In accordance with its Hebron commitments, Washington undertook to monitor fulfillment of the new agreement.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has, in recent months, expressed reservations about the American plan. In January he offered President Clinton a plan for a 9 percent second FRD, couched in heavy Israeli preconditions. At the time of the Ross visit, there were press reports in Israel and the United States that the Prime Minister, although boxed by Cabinet members opposed to any substantial withdrawal, was nevertheless prepared to accept an FRD above 10 percent -- a suggestion publicly denied and in conflict with firm government guidelines. Netanyahu has defined as "pressure" the emergence of the American "ideas," and their possible announcement by Washington. The danger Israel presumably faces from such a move lies in the prospect that an open rejection of a publicly presented U.S. plan that Arafat might grudgingly accept -- even a rejection explained by concerns about Palestinian security cooperation -- would brand Israel, in America and internationally, as the recalcitrant party. The risk is political; no threats to block American economic or security support for Israel -- the "traditional" forms of U.S. pressure -- are known to have been made. Certainly such pressure would be strongly opposed in Congress; 81 Senators signed an April 3 letter urging President Clinton not to put pressure on Israel by publicly presenting an "American plan" for withdrawal, and a similar letter is currently circulating in the House.

In sending Ambassador Ross to the Middle East, Secretary of State Albright indicated that failure of the parties to make progress might provoke an American decision to withdraw from active involvement in the process. She also appealed to American Jewish leaders to "help in having the Israeli government understand" the U.S. proposals. While polling results concerning the readiness of American Jews to countenance American pressure on Netanyahu have been mixed (the most authoritative poll, taken by the American Jewish Committee and released in March, found a majority of American Jews opposed such pressure, by a margin of 52 to 45 percent), Albright may have been influenced by results of a poll of Israelis that was reportedly commissioned by the U.S. (by Dahaf, completed on March 19). That survey found that 84 percent welcomed greater involvement in the process by President Clinton, 88 percent would like him to offer his own proposals, and 69 percent wanted pressure to be exerted on both Netanyahu and Arafat. On March 30, another poll (Geocartographia, Israeli TV Channel 1) showed that 53 percent of Israelis supported the American initiative, while 27 percent were opposed.

Two additional events in March appeared to dovetail with, and raise expectations for, a major American initiative. One was the controversial visit to Israel by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who made a chaotic stop at Har Homa; paid homage to the Palestinian Arabs killed at Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem, in 1948; and refused a government offer to tour the Holocaust memorial Yad Vashem. There were press reports that Cook's heavy criticism of Israel's settlement-building policies had been coordinated with Washington, raising speculation about a kind of "good cop-bad cop" scenario. At the same time, Albright, speaking to American Jewish leaders afterward, signaled displeasure with the confrontational aspects of the visit. Another development was the Palestinian reaction to the death of three Arab workers at a roadblock in the West Bank, when a series of misunderstandings led to Israeli troops opening fire. Despite heavy pressure from the Palestinian "street" to respond with violence, PLO leader Yasir Arafat sharply curtailed the resultant rioting and disorder in Palestinian towns -- presumably so as not to give Albright a reason to postpone her efforts.

Israeli Reaction

The Ross visit lasted three days, during which Palestinian statements were low key and generally encouraging. This created the impression that the American plan enjoyed Palestinian backing, even though official endorsement was never expressed. In contrast, both Israeli and American reaction made it clear that Netanyahu found the American ideas broadly unacceptable.

It is not certain to what extent the gap between the U.S. call for a 13.1 percent FRD and Israel's offer of approximately 9 percent was ever discussed. As the talks ended, an Israeli "senior political source" indicated that the Netanyahu government would not transfer 13 percent of the West Bank to the PA in all three of the FRDs taken together. Netanyahu reportedly suggested an FRD of reduced but "qualitative" proportions -- one that would improve the contiguity of Palestinian autonomous enclaves on the West Bank.

Clearly, Israel's rejection of the American plan was based on additional areas of disagreement, beyond the question of the quantity or even quality of land discussed. One is Netanyahu's insistence on eliminating the third FRD -- a provision of the Oslo II and Hebron accords to which the U.S. is committed -- so that Israel may retain maximum negotiating options in final status; if Netanyahu's major cards -- i.e., land -- are lost too early on, his negotiating position in the final status talks will be accordingly weakened. A second area of disagreement lies in the American call for a "time out" in the expansion of settlements and the building at Har Homa; the day after Ross's departure, Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to settlement-building. A third is the fact that, for the first time, a number of settlements would be rendered territorial enclaves, surrounded by the PA, in the event of any FRD beyond 6 to 7 percent.

In accordance with their views regarding all of these issue areas, the right-wing elements in the Cabinet have threatened to reject a second FRD of anything beyond symbolic proportions. Netanyahu might be able to squeeze through an FRD decision despite these potential defections. The Labor Party has indicated it would provide him with a "safety net" in the key Knesset approval vote. Alternatively, this might be the opportunity for him to opt to form a "unity government" with Labor, as many in the political center are urging, precisely in order to move ahead with the peace process. But for the time being, at least, he appears to have rejected these options, either because of short-term political considerations or because he himself identifies with the right-wing position.

Near Term Options

The U.S. administration will now presumably weigh a number of options. Two were already alluded to by Albright: publication of the American plan, and/or a public decision to withdraw from active involvement in the process. Israeli government sources have suggested that progress was in fact made by Ross, and that he will be sent for another round of talks; such a return visit is now expected after Passover. (Speaking to American Jewish organization officials on April 2, Ross said "some headway" was made, but no breakthrough was imminent.) On the other hand, Netanyahu offered a negative characterization of the talks when he stated, on March 31: "We're not suckers.... We don't give without receiving."

The American Jewish public, supportive of the peace process although increasingly wary of Arab intentions toward Israel, continues to express faith in the Israeli government's handling of negotiations. The latest AJC poll found a 56 to 34 percent margin supporting Netanyahu's efforts in the process, and a 66 to 30 percent majority voicing a "favorable" impression of the Prime Minister. (Support had slipped in the course of a year; AJC's 1997 survey found 61-to-24 backing for Netanyahu's handling of the peace process, and a 75-to-18 favorableness ratio.) Against that background, American Jewish civic organizations are being asked by the Israeli government to call attention to the potential dangers of U.S. "pressure," while at the same time they are being courted by Clinton and Albright to support the U.S. role. For historical perspective, it must be noted that the publication of American peace plans in the past -- the Rogers and Reagan plans come to mind -- did not advance their chances of acceptance.

The PLO, and the Arab world in general, will have to weigh their next move: An escalation in unrest? Further downgrading of Arab relations with Israel? New initiatives at the United Nations? Or a redoubled attempt to bring about American political pressure on Israel, based on Washington's commitments to the peace process, thereby generating a genuine American-Israeli rift? The first of these options risks violating the PLO commitment not to incite violence; the impact of all the options on Israeli public confidence in the peace process remains unclear.

As for the Netanyahu government, little immediate dissent with the Prime Minister's position was expressed, even from the more centrist elements in the coalition. The opposition, led by Labor, will undoubtedly now lead a renewed attempt to bring down the government in a vote of non-confidence. But Netanyahu's refusal to accept the American parameters for withdrawal appears to ensure that all 61 coalition members will hold firm.

Moreover, the controversy over the death in Ramallah in late March of Muhi al-Din Sharif, the second Hamas terrorist "Engineer," is likely to strengthen Israeli public support for a tough stance on Palestinian security performance. While Israel firmly denied any role in the killing, there was wide belief among Palestinians that Israeli security forces had carried it out. Although PA security officials -- exacerbating strains within Palestinian leadership -- quickly arrested five Hamas activists and charged that a Hamas faction was responsible for the bombmaker's murder, many Israelis remain bitter over those voices that had been raised on the Palestinian "street," as well as by the PLO leadership, suggesting Israel would have had no right to eliminate a Palestinian responsible for the brutal murder of dozens of Israelis.

One alternative avenue of advancing the peace process that Netanyahu has been exploring of late, against the background of stagnation on the Israeli-Palestinian track, is withdrawal from southern Lebanon. His proposal for Israel to withdraw in return for Lebanese security precautions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 has attracted considerable international attention, including in the Arab world. On April 1, he gained Cabinet approval for this position.

Netanyahu has moved the Lebanon withdrawal proposal to center stage. To date, the Lebanese government, dominated politically and militarily by Damascus, has refused to negotiate with Israel the security measures -- the only Israeli condition for withdrawal -- called for under 425. This points to an alternative idea, supported by such political rivals as Ariel Sharon on the right and Yossi Beilin on the left, to withdraw unilaterally without negotiations; in Sharon's formulation, the withdrawal would be in stages, with the understanding that Israel would retaliate severely in the event of renewed attacks across its northern border. Unilateral elimination of the Lebanese "security zone" would pose dangers both to Israeli security and Lebanese internal stability; for Syria, at an impasse with Israel on negotiations over the Golan, the move poses evident political costs in the potential reduction of conflict on Israel's border -- conflict Syria has nurtured through its cooperation with the Iranian-sponsored Hizbollah. Thus the only chance for progress regarding the Lebanon front may lie in the gray area of tacit understandings, where Syria and Iran are likely to be the ultimate arbiters.

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