Netanyahu's January Visit to Washington and the Second FRD

American Jewish Committee
Tuesday, 27 January 1998

An AJC Briefing

by Joseph Alpher, Director, Israel/Middle East Office

From January 20 to 22, 1998, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Washington for talks with the administration about the second further redeployment (FRD). He was followed there by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. Since Netanyahu's return to Israel, the State Department has followed up with plans for additional contacts, and Netanyahu has discussed with his Cabinet the possible implementation of the principal step proposed in Washington: a second FRD carried out according to a staggered schedule, with a close interlock between these partial redeployments and Palestinian compliance with specific commitments that Israel accuses the PLO of violating. But Israel and the PLO remain far apart on implementation of this plan.

In the midst of the Netanyahu-Arafat visits to Washington, the Monica Lewinsky Affair emerged. Any weakening of the standing of the American president could have ramifications for the ability of the US to shepherd this new version of the second FRD to fruition. This briefing explores the modalities of the new plan and political reactions to it in Israel.

The Staggered Interim Pullback

During the course of meetings in the fall and early winter, Secretary Albright had asked Netanyahu for a "double digit" second FRD, variously interpreted as 12% or 14% of the territory in the West Bank, to be carried out immediately (the deadline locked into the Hebron agreement of January 1997, of which the US is a guarantor, had passed last September). Most of this territory would become Area A, i.e., be turned over to full Palestinian control.

Netanyahu came to Washington with a set of Israeli cabinet decisions that clearly constituted a more constrained mandate than what the administration, or for that matter the PLO, had in mind. His proposals were understood to comprise no more than 10% of the land, conditioned upon Palestinian rectification of a far-reaching list of violations of undertakings made in the Hebron agreement. Netanyahu also requested that the requirement for a third FRD (also embodied in the Hebron agreement) be dropped in favor of final status talks beginning immediately after the second FRD.

Arafat countered by demanding an immediate FRD of up to 30%. He sought US confirmation of the commitment to a third FRD prior to final status talks, and a US commitment to a Palestinian state as the goal of those talks. He was ready to continue discussing improved execution of Palestinian security commitments. And—by way of fulfilling one of Netanyahu's conditions—he brought with him a list of the portions of the Palestinian National Charter that he considered canceled.

The administration sought to effect a compromise between these approaches. It reportedly suggested that a second FRD of 12% be segmented into three separate, smaller pullbacks. The first—made up of 4% of the territory, to be turned into Area B (wherein Israel retains security authority)—would be carried out unilaterally by Israel within two weeks of an agreement being reached. The second and third would be staggered over several more months, and conditioned on Palestinian compliance with at least some of Israel's demands, as negotiated with American mediation. The administration endorsed Arafat's demand for a third FRD, as agreed a year ago, and—by way of partially satisfying Arafat's request that the US support his goal of statehood—President Clinton publicly stated the need for Palestinian self-determination.

Neither Netanyahu nor Arafat has publicly rejected the new American package, but neither has endorsed it. Netanyahu in particular has indicated that a great many difficult details remain to be discussed, and Secretary Albright and Ambassador Dennis Ross are expected to be meeting with both leaders in the coming weeks.

Netanyahu

In dealing with any additional territorial withdrawal on the West Bank, Netanyahu faces an almost axiomatic threat from one wing or the other of his coalition. Around a dozen right wingers, spearheaded by the National Religious Party, have vowed to leave the government if any additional FRD is carried out. Privately, they claim that they agreed to give Netanyahu a mandate to discuss an FRD in Washington on the understanding that the stringent conditions that they had attached would guarantee non-compliance by Arafat, thereby freeing Israel of its territorial obligations. The death in January of NRP leader Zevulun Hammer, a moderate, is thought likely to have left the party with an even more hawkish stance. On the other hand, the Third Way party is pledged to leave the coalition if no further withdrawals are carried out. In early January, Minister of Defense Yitzhak Mordechai also threatened to resign within three months unless the second FRD is executed. Virtually any new defection from the coalition could usher in early elections in Israel.

The list of conditions for an Israeli withdrawal presented by Netanyahu does indeed comprise a number of demands that many observers had understood the government was already satisfied with, thus creating the impression that they were introduced in order to guarantee an Arafat rejection. For example, a month before Netanyahu's US trip a senior aide of his remarked privately that the Palestinian National Covenant was no longer an interim issue; Netanyahu himself stated publicly some months ago that extradition of Palestinian terrorist murderers—another Israeli demand considered to be a non-starter with the PLO—was not a burning issue. And many outstanding security issues were thought to have been resolved in a recent CIA-brokered memo between Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs. But other demands, such as the confiscation of weaponry from Islamic extremists and the reduction in size of Palestinian security forces, are broadly supported by the Israeli public and endorsed by the security establishment.

Netanyahu evidently not only tailored his approach to the second FRD in Washington so as to maintain his freedom of maneuver within his coalition. He also feared, or anticipated, presidential pressure upon him to be more forthcoming regarding territorial concessions. This apparently explains Netanyahu's meetings with American congressional and religious leaders thought to be more sympathetic to his point of view, even at the risk, as in the case of Reverend Jerry Falwell, of alienating both the president and portions of the American Jewish community. In any event, by emerging from the visit without having been pressured into any immediate concessions, Netanyahu at least temporarily strengthened his power base in Israel. After trailing in the polls behind Labor's Ehud Barak by up to 10 points in recent months, Netanyahu closed the gap upon his return from Washington to an even 41-41. This comeback can be attributed largely to the "return to the fold" of traditional right wing voters who had declared themselves "undecided" of late, due to doubts about Netanyahu's leadership.

Arafat

The PLO leader could take some comfort in Clinton's support for his position regarding the fulfillment of outstanding Israeli territorial obligations. But he was also put on notice that greater compliance on security issues would be demanded of him in return for US backing regarding the segmented second FRD—particularly in view of the current high alert in Israel regarding an impending Hamas terrorist bombing. Arafat's visit, which began January 22, was virtually screened from the public eye by the Monica Lewinsky affair—to the extent that Arab commentators labeled the affair an Israeli plot!

Arafat's visit was also notable for the flap over his invitation to the Holocaust Museum. Beyond the obvious and understandable sensitivities that the issue raised, it also highlighted the broad ignorance among Arab intellectual and leadership elites regarding the role of the Holocaust in the formation of Israel's world view.

Clinton, the Lewinsky Affair, and the Peace Process

To the extent that the Lewinsky affair weakens or paralyzes the Clinton presidency, it weakens the peace process. This is because the United States, bowing to the active solicitation of both Israel and the PLO, has become the primary mediator and essential third signatory to all agreements since the negotiations over the January 1997 Hebron pact. Without its active and forceful participation, backed by the prestige and involvement of the presidency, the process is almost certain to begin backsliding.

Netanyahu, who, as we have noted, faces coalition problems whether the peace process progresses or not, and who arrived in Washington apprehensive of American pressure, is not likely to be unduly exercised by the prospect of a weakened president. Arafat, on the other hand, has already reacted by lobbying all the more energetically for a European role, and, on January 27, he and Egyptian President Mubarak publicly called for a Euro-Arab summit on the peace process. This dovetails with the proactive approach to a European role, possibly coupled with European economic pressure on Israel, that is increasingly being supported by France and additional EU member states.

Secretary Albright is expected to visit the Middle East within days—primarily because of the need to consult about and ensure Arab support for an anticipated punitive attack against Iraqi non-conventional weapons development sites. She will almost certainly wish to testify to some ongoing progress toward implementation of the new US-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian package deal on a staggered interim pullback. Hence, as of the time of writing, the Middle East peace process remains a high priority for the administration. It, together with the escalating crisis with Iraq, are likely to be seen as key indicators of the capacity of the Clinton administration to deal with international issues at a time of acute domestic crisis.

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