Arafat, the Palestinian Authority and Violence Against Israel

American Jewish Committee
Friday, 25 July 1997

Does Yasir Arafat deliberately or tacitly employ violence as a tactic in the Palestinian dispute with Israel? This briefing seeks to shed light on the complexity of both the question and the answer.

The Factual Backdrop

In March 1997, the terrorist attack at Cafe Apropos in Tel Aviv raised strong suspicions among Israeli security authorities that PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat had given a "green light" (or perhaps merely a "yellow light") to terrorism against Israeli civilians. These suspicions were based primarily on Arafat's alleged remarks several days earlier to Hamas activists, as well as his release of Hamas leaders. Arafat and his close associates vehemently denied the charge. The issue was played out against the backdrop of a stalled peace process and Israeli construction at Har Homa, and a Palestinian decision, in response, to radically reduce security coordination with Israel.

In June and July, with security cooperation still minimal and the peace process still stagnant, extensive rioting by Palestinians took place in Hebron, directed against Jewish settlers and Israeli security forces. Ostensibly, the main "trigger" to the rioting was the "pig poster" denigrating the Prophet Mohammad and the Koran, drawn by a Jewish settler and posted in Arab Hebron. But it quickly became clear that the Palestinian security authorities were busing demonstrators into Hebron from neighboring villages and paying them to throw stones and Molotov cocktails. Moreover, the authorities refused to intervene and restrain the demonstrators, in direct contravention of Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Jibril Rajoub, chief of the PA's principal security arm in the West Bank, declared publicly that he would not intervene, insofar as the violence had been caused by Israel's failure to pursue the peace process. Intervention was brought about only after Israel threatened to bring life in the entire city of Arab Hebron to a halt.

Most recently, in mid-July, Israeli security authorities apprehended three armed Palestinian policemen, illegally present in Area C in the West Bank, apparently on their way to attack Jewish settlers. Interrogation of the three revealed that they had been involved in earlier attacks. The investigation implicated their direct commander, a colonel in the Palestinian police; apparently, communications intercepts also implicated the commander of the Palestinian police in the West Bank, General Ghazi Jebali. Ami Ayalon, head of the Shabak (Israel's internal security service), declared that he had no evidence of involvement by Arafat. The latter hastened to appoint a commission to investigate.

Assessment

The overall drift of this pattern of events, juxtaposed with assessments from a variety of sources, points to the likelihood that Arafat has decided to permit a degree of violence against Israelis, as a means of signaling his inability to maintain the status quo when con-fronted with what he perceives as Israeli intransigence in the peace process. In some cases, as in Hebron initially and in occasional rioting at other friction points like Rachel's Tomb, this may be a case of a controlled "release of steam" designed to prevent more violent events. In other cases, it may reflect a certain weakening of Arafat's control. But there can be little doubt that, from his perspective, violence remains a "legitimate" means in Arafat's rather limited store of options for dealing with Israel under difficult circumstances.

Clearly, Arafat appreciates the need to "fine tune" the violence in order to avoid excesses. But mistakes (from his standpoint), as well as uncontrolled excesses, are possible. Presumably Arafat understands that the Israeli public "gets the message," without reacting against him, when there is rioting without loss of life, and in reaction to acts perceived as Israeli provocation, as in Hebron initially; hence it is likely that here he made direct decisions as to when to commence and when to cease.

On the other hand, the use of Palestinian policemen to attack settlers -- outrageous on its face -- appears to exceed the pattern; Arafat's own logic (to the extent we understand it), together with the assessments of seasoned observers, suggests that Arafat might condone such attacks at this juncture if made by civilians, thereby being "deniable" and "explainable," but would not wish to implicate the Palestinian Authority or its security forces, for fear of the repercussions on Israeli-Palestinian relations at the most basic level.

There can be no doubt that the prolonged stagnation in the peace process, coupled with economic deprivation in the West Bank and Gaza, embody the potential to weaken Arafat's grip on power. The use of violence might be one way for him to consolidate power under such circumstances. Whether, and to what extent, Arafat's political authority has indeed been eroded is a matter of differing assessments among observers.

Finally, there are also multiple assessments, including among Palestinians close to Arafat, that he is fading physically under the prolonged burden of leadership and the recent tensions generated by the stagnation. This might provoke individual security chiefs to take matters -- including violence - into their own hands.

Conclusion

Few Israeli supporters of the Oslo process have ever pretended that Arafat, or indeed the PLO as a whole, are ideal peace partners -- only that there is no better alternative. The use of violence -- often low-level demonstrations, occasionally worse -- will likely remain one of the arrows in the PLO quiver at least until it achieves a status, and obtains resources, that enable it to rely on classical political means of realizing its policies. Violence will also remain a relatively easy option as long as Israelis and Palestinians live and/or work in close proximity, and behave aggressively toward one another, as in Hebron and around several other settlements.

In this context, the ongoing quiet in Jerusalem, despite the Har Homa controversy, is an important indicator that when Arafat prefers to avoid violent demonstrations, he can do so. In any event, even beyond a successful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recent history teaches us that the Middle East embodies considerable societal and political potential for violence.

No doubt, a dynamic renewal of the peace process would reduce the likelihood of violence by Palestinians. But not entirely. Arafat himself has been, at a minimum, guilty of negligence on this score, as in February-March 1996. Moreover, one explanation currently offered for the relative reduction in suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad is that these were designed to stop the peace process. Since the process at the moment is barely alive, the Islamic extremists feel no need to invoke such terrorist acts. As a corollary it follows that a renewed peace process might indeed generate new terrorist attacks upon Israel, attacks not sponsored in any way by Arafat, but which Israel would justifiably demand that he make every effort to thwart.

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