New Report: Chinese Arms And Technology Transfers To Iran

American Jewish Committee
Wednesday, 25 June 1997

"In the past decade, the People's Republic of China has emerged as one of Iran's main sources of conventional arms and technology to produce nonconventional (chemical, biological, and nuclear) weapons."

So states Michael Eisenstadt, a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Eisenstadt is one of three contributors to a newly-released American Jewish Committee report titled "Chinese Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Implications for the United States, Israel, and the Middle East." The briefing, prepared by AJC's Asia and Pacific Rim Institute (APRI), also includes a short study by Dr. Dov Zakheim, a former Defense Department official, and the congressional testimony of Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.

In his foreword to the report, Barry Jacobs, Assistant Director of APRI and a former U.S. foreign service officer, notes: "In recent months, Iran has done nothing to moderate its open hostility to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or the process of normalization between Israel and Islamic states in the Middle East, Africa and the Gulf, or to diminish its material support for Hizbollah and other terrorist forces.

"While China is not the only foreign supplier of advanced military technology to Iran, and the U.S. continues to press Beijing to adhere to non-proliferation agreements, Chinese sales to Iran of potentially destabilizing weapons and weapons technology pose ominous challenges to Western policy makers."

Mr. Eisenstadt asserts that while the U.S. was able to effectively block several major arms transfers to Iran by Eastern European and other countries following the Iran-Iraq war, only Russia and China continue to ignore U.S. pressure and sell conventional arms to Iran.

Quantitatively, he adds, China is more or less on par with Russia as a supplier of conventional arms. However, while Russia can provide world class high-tech weapons, China generally provides Iran with older, less expensive low-tech weapons that are used to fill out the country's force structure.

Nonetheless, "China has played a crucial role in Iran's naval buildup. This is of particular importance because it is in the naval arena that U.S. interests and those of its Arab Gulf allies are most deeply engaged, and it is in this arena that the armed forces of the two countries operate in proximity on a daily basis….China also plays an important role in Iran's ballistic missile program….is deeply involved in Iran's chemical weapons program…[and] is a main supplier of civilian nuclear technology….China is also believed to be helping Iran build fuel cycle-related facilities."

Looking at U.S. policy, Mr. Eisenstadt notes that "U.S. efforts to influence China to curb or cease the transfer of potentially destabilizing conventional arms or nonconventional weapon-related technology are likely to have only a marginal impact on Chinese behavior."

Among the reasons he cites: "First, China's relationship with Iran is only one of a long list of issues that complicate relations between the U.S. and China...Second, the U.S. does not want to jeopardize billions of dollars in trade with China…Third, China sees Iran as an important trade partner, an ally against the U.S., a potentially important actor in Central Asia, and perhaps a country that could cause problems in the largely Muslim provinces of western China should it desire to do so. Fourth, Beijing may also be interested in a political alliance with Tehran as a means of achieving long-term economic security for its rapidly growing economy."

In conclusion, he writes: "Economic sanctions and other strategies of finance denial, which prevent Iran from acquiring the hard currency resources needed to purchase arms and sensitive technologies, may be the only way to prevent - or at least delay - pending arms and reactor deals between Iran and China. For these to be effective, however, Europe and Japan have to join the U.S. in applying economic sanctions to Iran. As long as this does not occur, the prospects for curtailing destabilizing Chinese arms and technology transfers to Iran seem poor, at best."

Dr. Zakheim, looking at the implications for Israel of Chinese missile sales to Iran, states that anti-ship cruise missiles, which China has sold to Iran since the 1980's, "are not likely to have a major impact on Israel's ability to carry out its military objectives, unless these missiles, or the technology for their manufacture, were transferred to Syria. That," he stresses, "is a likelihood that should not be understated. Iran and Syria have embarked on a number of cooperative military arrangements…Should Syria obtain Chinese-built or -designed anti-ship cruise missiles either directly or from Iran, it would possess a formidable threat to Israel's Navy.

"More ominous for Israeli security, however, is the Chinese transfer of ballistic missiles to Iran, which began in 1985….Tehran is seeking to develop a missile with a 3000 kilometer capability, one that would leave no part of Israel as a safe haven."

In addition, he notes that China is a primary source of missile guidance technology for Iran. "Improved guidance can permit greater range for missiles that normally would not threaten Israel by allowing for smaller warhead size."

While China "clearly contributes to the threat to Israel, albeit indirectly," Israel does have some leverage over China in terms of the $3 billion worth of technology and subsystems it has transferred to China since the 1980's. It may now be the time for "Israel to exploit its excellent relations with Beijing to become part of the 'solution' to weapons proliferation."

Mr. Einhorn, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, notes that nonproliferation is one of a handful of core issues on the U.S. - China bilateral agenda.

"China's problematic record of exports can be attributed largely to conscious decisions by Chinese leaders to pursue policies deemed to be in China's national interest. In the case of Iran, there has probably been more of a mixture of foreign policy and commercial motivations….But there is an additional factor that explains the lack of sufficient Chinese export restraint. China still does not have an effective national system to control exports of sensitive goods and technologies. Even when Beijing is willing to exercise restraint, its ability to do so in a substantial number of cases may be inadequate."

Mr. Einhorn does make a special note, however, of China's evolving attitude toward nonproliferation norms through a variety of actions it took throughout the 1990's.

He adds: "Both the U.S. and China recognize a shared interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, and this is reflected in common approaches to many issues. China has come a long way from the 1960's, when its declaratory policy supported nuclear proliferation as a means of 'breaking the hegemony of the superpowers.' Since then, as China has gained stature and influence in world affairs and become a leading participant in such international forums as the U.N. security Council and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, it has increasingly come to appreciate that Chinese national security interests are not served by the spread of dangerous military capabilities, especially to areas close to China, and that acceptance of international norms is one of the attributes and responsibilities of great power status."

Efforts to discourage questionable Chinese exports should proceed on two tracks, he asserts. "We must seek to persuade China that a more restrained policy toward certain exports or arms and dual-use goods and technologies would serve China's security interests by promoting regional and international stability and would bring China's policies more into line with global norms. At the same time, we should seek to cooperate with China in the strengthening of its national export control mechanisms and procedures so that Beijing will have more effective means of ensuring that exports by Chinese entities fully conform to China's own national policies and international commitments."

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