Israel And The Middle East: Questions And Answers

American Jewish Committee
Friday, 28 March 1997

Isn't the Netanyahu government responsible for the current crisis?

The Netanyahu government was not elected on a mandate to simply follow the path of the Peres government. If so, the electorate would have returned Shimon Peres to office, but it chose not to. Instead, the majority of Israeli voters sent a clear message -- we want a peace process but at a slower pace and with more evidence of Arab, and particularly Palestinian, good faith and reciprocity than we have witnessed to date.

Given the Netanyahu election platform, which was hostile to the Oslo process and the concept of negotiation with Yasir Arafat, the first nine months of Netanyahu's administration have shown a rather dramatic turnaround. Notwithstanding his election platform, he has embraced the Oslo process and made it his government's policy, engaged directly with Arafat, achieved the Hebron agreement and disengagement, released Palestinian female prisoners held in Israeli jails, increased substantially the number of Palestinians permitted to work in Israel, and adhered to Israel's obligation, under Oslo, to the first of three scheduled redeployments from areas of the West Bank - before the conclusion of final status negotiations.

These steps taken by Netanyahu are frequently overlooked in the current discussion; yet they signal an important rethinking of Likud doctrine and augur well for the peace process insofar as they reflect the will of a much more united country (70-80%) than was the case under the previous government when Israel was far more divided.

At the same time, the debate within the Likud Party and its coalition partners has been, and continues to be, intense, which helps explain the zigs and zags in Netanyahu's policies, i.e., a move to the left (the Hebron redeployment), a move to the right (the start of the Har Homa construction at this time). This can make it quite difficult to ascertain a game plan or anticipate future Israeli moves.

Remember, too, that there were crises even when the Peres government was in office. The series of four terrorist attacks took place last February and March when Shimon Peres was in office and the peace process was moving at a faster clip. The deadline for a Hebron agreement was March 1996, again when Peres was in office, but it was not met (and more likely it would have led to defiance by Israeli settlers had it been implemented at that time). The territories were closed by Peres after the series of bombings, preventing all but a small number of Palestinian workers from entering Israel and thus putting a severe strain on the economic well-being of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Despite agreement, Palestinian women held in Israeli jails were not released.

And the tensions were not limited to links with the Palestinians either. Ties with Egypt experienced strains that date back to the Rabin years and continued during the brief Peres period, though the Egyptian rhetoric wasn't quite as vituperative as it is today. Still, Egypt led an international drive to isolate Israel regarding the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), kept its distance in the bilateral sphere, and sought to assert its leadership in the Arab world, inter alia, by discouraging other Arab nations from moving closer to Israel without Cairo's consent.

Yes, but aren't Netanyahu's provocative policies, such as expanding settlements, the reason for Palestinian anger and resentment?

There is no question that Netanyahu has taken a different approach to several key issues than his predecessor, often talking tougher about alleged Palestinian violations of the Oslo accords and demanding greater reciprocity in the negotiating process, as well as insisting on Israel's right not only to maintain settlements but to expand them as well. At the same time, since Netanyahu took office, notwithstanding the rhetoric, there have been no new settlements.

Which brings us to Har Homa. Isn't that a settlement?

Language can be very charged. By calling it a settlement, the Arabs -- and many in the press who accept this terminology -- seek to conjure up images of a form of Israeli colonialism. While there can be legitimate differences over the wisdom of beginning construction at Har Homa now, there can be no dispute that Har Homa sits within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, that it is today barren, i.e. unoccupied by anyone, thus requiring no displacement, and that the land on which most of the Jewish housing is planned is legally owned by Jews, purchased from Arabs in the past.

This helps explain why the Israelis insist on calling this a new Jewish neighborhood, and reject its description as a settlement. Note that, while the Labor Party now urges delay in construction, it has always supported, together with Likud, Israel's right to build at Har Homa and elsewhere in Jerusalem. In fact, since 1967, a number of new neighborhoods have been built in the city.

What about Jerusalem? Why shouldn't it become the capital of two countries?

It is the position of AJC, consistent with the policy of both major political parties in Israel, that Jerusalem is, and shall remain, the undivided capital of the State of Israel. Importantly, President Clinton himself is on record as supporting a unified Jerusalem, saying it should never again be divided, as is the U.S. Congress.

It is our view that the Israeli, or, if you will, Jewish, claim to Jerusalem is far more compelling and persuasive than the Palestinian or Muslim. Here are the reasons why:

Current calls for a "shared" Jerusalem or even a re-divided city are hypocritical because they pre-judge and seek to prejudice the outcome of the final status of Jerusalem negotiations by advocating either a de facto or a de jure re-partition of the city.

Those who live outside of Jerusalem and who make such reckless calls want to "close the deal" in advance and thus preclude future talks that will involve those who are directly involved with the city. It is an example of dictatorial bias whether it stems from the pulpit, the media, or the classroom.

Divided cities have never worked successfully anywhere in the world nor have they brought peace.

Berlin with its walls was a glaring example of the failure of internationalization or "sharing", even with solemn promises of only four nations. The same four---the United States, the former Soviet Union, France, and Britain---gave up their internationalized control of Vienna in 1955. And the internationalized "Free City" of Danzig of the 1930s was a disaster, and many believe that its abnormal status contributed to the start of World War II.

Yasir Arafat's disingenuous comparison of present-day Rome and a future Jerusalem is dangerous and misleading.

While, of course, the Vatican is a separate nation-state within the city of Rome, the Holy See has not been at war with the Republic of Italy nor has it ever worked for the Italian state's destruction. To compare a possible Palestinian capital in Jerusalem with the Vatican is wildly inaccurate and is cunningly designed to deceive Americans of good will.

In some of the rhetoric swirling around Jerusalem, one frequently perceives an odious anti-Israel double standard of judgment at work.

It is as if Chairman Arafat can do no wrong and Prime Minister Netanyahu can do no right. The Palestine Liberation Organization is continually perceived an exemplary revolutionary movement, and Israel is often portrayed as a repressive, racist state.

Incredibly, many people have forgotten, or do not know, that between 1948 and 1967, Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Jordan's occupation was officially recognized by only two nations: Great Britain and Pakistan. During that bleak 19 year period Jordan consistently violated Article 8 of its armistice agreement with Israel that was meant to guarantee Jews free access to the Jewish Holy Places and cultural institutions, seized by Jordan in the 1948 war.

All Jews, not simply Israelis, were forbidden to visit the Western Wall, the Mount of Olives cemetery, Rachel's Tomb near Bethlehem, and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Jews were also banned from using Mount Scopus' medical and educational institutions: Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University.

Moreover, Israeli Muslims were not permitted to visit the Old City. There was, however, one small concession: Israeli Christians were allowed to visit their Holy Places in the Old City, but only on Christmas and Easter.

During those 19 years of a divided Jerusalem, 55 synagogues in the Old City were destroyed, the Western Wall area became a slum, and many Jewish gravestones were removed from the Mount of Olives by the Arab Legion to construct the foundations, walls, and latrines of a military camp. Ironically, during the 19 years that Jordan controlled the Old City, the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia never once journeyed to Jerusalem.

You should be especially aware of the growing use of the inaccurate phrase "Arab East Jerusalem." This term conveniently overlooks the fact that the ancient Jewish Quarter in the Old City is in East Jerusalem as are the Mt. Scopus facilities of the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital. And, of course, the world's largest, and one of its oldest, Jewish cemetery is on the Mt. of Olives...all are in "Arab East Jerusalem."

By 1949 every Arab state except one publicly endorsed the "internationalization" of Jerusalem as a diplomatic means of weakening Israel's claim and hold on the city. The lone Arab exception was Jordan which, of course, controlled the Old City and parts of East Jerusalem.

Because of Jordan's opposition, the United Nations abandoned any plans to implement the internationalization recommendation. And between 1948 and 1967, there were no calls for "sharing" the city coming from the churches, diplomats, the media, or, of course, the Palestinians. On the contrary, a brutally divided, hostile Holy City was tolerated.

It was only after the Israeli reunification of Jerusalem in 1967 that calls for internationalization or a "sharing" were heard. Happily, in 1968 the Vatican abandoned its previous call for internationalization, and in 1993 when the Holy See and Israel established formal diplomatic relations, there was no mention of Jerusalem in the Fundamental Agreement that the two nation-states signed.

The proposal to "share" Jerusalem, in effect, can mean the re-partitioning of Jerusalem, a sure recipe for increased violence. For that reason, such proposals represent a grave disservice to the already fragile peace process because they undermine the final status talks between Israel and the PLO.

Another mischievous claim is that Jerusalem is "equally sacred" to all three religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This is an acute case of "religious equivalency" regarding Jerusalem. That is, the religious ties and claims to the city by Jews, Christians, and Muslims are all the same, equal in nature.

But they are not the same. In fact, the Prophet Muhammad never visited Jerusalem during his lifetime, and the city ranks behind Mecca and Medina in religious sanctity for Muslims. Jerusalem is not mentioned in the Koran although Muslims believe that the Prophet was miraculously transported from Mecca to Jerusalem, and from there made his nocturnal ascent to heaven.

The Arabs under Omar, a Muslim Caliph, conquered the city for the first time in 638 C.E.---more than sixteen hundred years after King David made the city Israel's capital. And not once during Arab rule in the city (638-1099) did Jerusalem serve as an Arab capital. In that regard, Jerusalem is far different from such cities as Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo. Historically, it is only the Jews who have made Jerusalem their capital city.

For Jews, Jerusalem is not merely the sum of its Holy Places; instead the entire city is sacred and central to Jewish belief. Jerusalem is mentioned in the Hebrew Bible 750 times, and Zion 180 times. Since the time of King David, Jews have always lived in Jerusalem, except for the times when they were expelled by force. Nor are the Jewish religious ties to Jerusalem limited to the Bible. There is a rich post-Biblical tradition as well including the closing prayer of each Passover Seder: "Next Year in Jerusalem!"

In 1844, Jews were the largest single religious group in the city, and, in 1872, they outnumbered the Christians and the Muslims combined. The Jews became the majority in Jerusalem a quarter century before Theodor Herzl convened the first Zionist Congress in 1897.

Since 1967, the Holy Places of all three faiths have been open to all religious groups as never before, and they are administered by the appropriate Jewish, Christian, and Islamic authorities.

Israel's policy guarantees freedom of religion, free movement throughout Jerusalem (except in cases of severe security emergencies), and free access to the Holy Places for everyone. It is a policy that has been adhered to by every Israeli government since 1967, and it has made Jerusalem more open to all than ever before.

And, finally, shared or divided sovereignty has never worked. Jerusalem, if it is to have any prospect for peace, must be placed under one sovereignty. And if an undivided Jerusalem is to be placed under the jurisdiction of one state, that state should surely continue to be Israel, with built-in protections for the preservation of the Arab character of Arab parts of Jerusalem.

That Israel wishes to strengthen its claim to Jerusalem by establishing facts on the ground is in a sense no different than the Palestinian strategy which, by seeking to use Orient House and various other offices in the eastern part of Jerusalem as quasi-governmental sites (in violation of the Oslo accords), is also attempting to create facts. However, the compelling Israeli claim to Jerusalem and therefore Israel's right to proceed with municipal development (for Jewish and Arab residents alike), is permitted under the Oslo agreements.

Why is Israel being so stubborn? Why doesn't Israel give the Palestinians what they say they want, that is, the territories taken from them in 1967?

First of all, the territories were not taken from the Palestinians in 1967; they were taken from Jordan which had occupied them since 1948. In 1967, Jordan joined in a war, together with Egypt and Syria, against Israel, despite well-documented efforts by Israel to discourage Jordan from joining the war effort.

Jordan's occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank were never internationally recognized. Moreover, of course, Jordan's occupation of the eastern part of Jerusalem resulted in the denial of access for Jews to the Old City and the desecration of synagogues and cemeteries, all in violation of the Armistice accords.

Thus, despite Palestinian attempts to revise history, the reality is there has never been a sovereign Palestinian entity in the West Bank or in Gaza (which was quite brutally occupied by Egypt until 1967). It is clear one is emerging before our eyes. But we must counter the myth that all the Palestinians are asking for today is the "return" of "their" land and the "re-establishment" of their "sovereign existence". Nor has Jerusalem ever been the capital of any Arab country.

Moreover, there are those who believe the Palestinian territorial claim would not necessarily be satisfied even if further major concessions were made by Israel. For example, no serious Israeli speaks of returning all the land of the West Bank seized in 1967. Yet who is to say, in the final analysis, the Palestinians would be satisfied with less, regardless of what is currently being said by Palestinian spokesmen? Or that demands would not be extended to parts of Israel proper at a later date, the original home, after all, of many Palestinians? Yes, this is the "stages" approach that has always been an underlying fear of many Israelis, which may or may not still be alive in the deepest recesses of the thinking of some key Palestinians.

Further, Israel is being asked to do something which is quite unprecedented in the annals of recorded history. As the victor nation in three wars of aggression against it (1948, 1967 and 1973) whose aim was nothing less than Israel's destruction (and remember that in 1948 and 1967 there was no Israel occupation of the West Bank and Gaza), Israel is now being asked to withdraw from the land it seized and place its confidence in a peace process and negotiated agreements (and of course the continued deterrent power of its military operating from a much smaller land area).

That would be risky for any nation; it is especially so for Israel for three reasons that are not always readily grasped by those far from the scene:

(a) Israel, in its 1967 borders, was only nine miles wide at its narrowest point, a point incidentally close to its main population centers. Americans, who are blessed with a country the size of a continent, have a hard time imagining this. Most Americans' daily commute is far more than this distance. And the range of even quite primitive weapons today means that much of Israel would be within easy target distance were Israel to relinquish all the territory it seized in the '67 war.

(b) Israel is not negotiating with democracies. It's one thing to sign an agreement with Canada or Sweden, quite another to seek an accord with authoritarian leaders whose commitment to democracy and rule of law in the Western sense is at best tenuous. To state the obvious, far greater risks are entailed.

(c) Israel is situated in the most arms-laden region in the world, not to mention the ever present danger of Islamic extremism, and therefore can never, not even for a moment, let up its guard. Biological and chemical, even nuclear, weapons development programs are actively under way in several Arab states and Iran, as are missile development programs.

In Iran, for example, an aggressive effort is being made to develop ground-to-ground missiles with a range of 2000 kilometers (1200 miles), enough to reach Israel and well beyond.

Syria is known to possess chemical weapons and ground-to-ground missiles, and once again is seeking closer military ties with Russia.

And in Egypt, though this has received much less attention, a very substantial military modernization program has been undertaken and there are reliable reports of Egyptian cooperation with North Korea to develop ground-to-ground missiles.

All this means that Israel has very little margin for error. There is but one Israel. It is tiny, even with the territories. It is located in a dangerous and highly combustible part of the world (as Americans should have understood when Iraq invaded Kuwait and it took America six months of coalition building and force build-up to extricate Iraq from Kuwait, though not Saddam Hussein from power). Israel is surrounded by some who have indicated a sincere desire for accommodation, and even by a rare few who are prepared to legitimize the existence of a Jewish homeland in their midst, but others who still call for its destruction (it was just six years ago that over three dozen Iraqi missiles rained down on Israel), and so it must proceed slowly, cautiously, with the Palestinians as with others, such as Syria.

Yes, but won't it be a demilitarized Palestinian state? What does Israel have to fear from such a state? Isn't Israel the strongest power in the region?

To put it most simply and starkly, Israel, despite its truly impressive military strength and resilience, is caught between a set of unpalatable choices, each with its own attendant risks. Either it relinquishes further territory, strikes the best agreement on paper it can, and keeps a watchful eye on the nascent Palestinian state, or it clings to territories (for ideological or strategic reasons) with high concentrations of Palestinians and continues as an occupying power over an increasingly defiant population that wishes to oust the Israelis. There are no good choices here, much less easy ones, and those who would suggest there are simply don't understand the situation or the region (or begin with no sympathy for Israel).

First, despite the frequent use of the term "demilitarized", it is hard to believe that this is possible. No state in this volatile region can ever survive without some means of defending itself. There are simply too many predator states in the Middle East, and the region itself only understands power and strength, as history has shown again and again. Even now we see that the Palestinians are largely ignoring the limits on the "police" force permitted them under the Oslo accords and there is very little the Israelis seem able to do about it.

Does this mean that a Palestinian state could pose an existential threat to the State of Israel? It's unlikely, but, as we've seen just from the impact of terrorist attacks, a good deal of damage can be done; we've seen the same from Lebanon, a weak state that has been largely overrun by its predator neighbor Syria (with barely a peep from the international community), with mortar and terrorist attacks on northern Israel by Hezbullah operating from southern Lebanon (despite the Israeli security zone).

And what if a weak Palestinian state tempted, say, the Syrians to seek hegemony as they've done in Lebanon?

This is not to argue against the establishment of a Palestinian state, but only to underscore the kinds of real dangers Israel will be faced with and therefore the compelling logic of Israeli caution and concern.

No one has a monopoly of wisdom on what path Israel ought to pursue. A certain degree of intellectual humility is in order as many Israelis understandably weave back and forth between support for policies that express their hopes for an era of peace and normalization and support for policies that reflect their fears that the surrounding region is fundamentally and permanently opposed to Israel's presence (i.e. a non-Muslim, non-Arab sovereign presence) in their midst.

But won't Israeli hesitation only invite more terrorist attacks or even a resumption of the intifadah?

Remember, terrorist attacks occurred when the peace process was in higher gear, too, so simply accelerating the peace process won't necessarily guarantee a halt to terror or violence.

Israel is committed to proceeding with the peace process, still the best, indeed the only realistic, hope for attempting to break the cycle of war and hostility in the region, but needs to be assured, at every step of the way, of Palestinian sincerity and commitment to the process (and signed agreements). Mixed signals coming from Yasir Arafat don't help. A negotiating strategy which turns each roadblock into an international incident, or which uses the threat or reality of violence (witness the tunnel episode in September 1996, which left nearly 100 people dead based on a bogus Palestinian claim that the tunnel encroached on Muslim holy sites) when there is unhappiness on the Palestinian side, is not a promising approach. Nor are verbal acrobatics over whether the Palestinian Covenant has been amended, leaving most observers thoroughly mystified.

Either Arafat is in charge or he's not. If he is, then he must exercise control over the militant Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, with whom he is in regular touch, and those activists cum terrorists currently being released from Palestinian custody. (The Palestinian practice is often to arrest extremists in their own ranks with great fanfare to show a face of moderation and then quietly to release them when the world's attention is directed elsewhere). As the American Jewish Committee wrote to Chairman Arafat on March 21st after the suicide bombing in the Tel Aviv cafe, and as we note in a full page ad in The New York Times on March 28, we are not at all convinced, far from it, that he is doing his utmost to end Palestinian terrorism. And if Arafat is not in control of these forces or of the Palestinian "street", then with whom is Israel negotiating?

No nation, neither Israel nor any other, can negotiate under the threat of violence. No one underestimates the gap between the current Israeli and Palestinian positions on key questions, from borders to refugees to Jerusalem, but the Madrid (1991) and Oslo (1993) processes launched, or at least were intended to launch, a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations -- resolution of issues at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield or in the streets.

The AJC continues to stress the need for negotiations, no matter how tough the issues, at that table, with U.S. facilitation as needed (though none was necessary for Oslo), and not a periodic resort to violence or the threat of violence by the Palestinian side.

How does AJC view the Clinton Administration's posture towards Arab-Israeli issues in recent weeks?

AJC has long believed that the Clinton Administration's overall record towards Israel is remarkably positive. Moreover, the U.S. effort to advance the peace process has been not only helpful, but vital in achieving the progress we have witnessed of late, including the Hebron agreement. And we applaud the Administration's decision to cast its vote with Israel at the United Nations, both in the Security Council, where it has used its veto, and the General Assembly.

At the same time, we are concerned about some recent statements and actions that fail to make the necessary distinctions between the Israeli and Palestinian positions, including initial Administration statements, subsequently amended, defending Arafat's role in combatting Palestinian terror, when the latest evidence certainly suggests otherwise, or the U.S. haste in agreeing to attend the recent "international" meeting in Gaza called by Arafat.

Doesn't the United Nations have an important role to play here?

No, it doesn't. The proven method for advancing Arab-Israeli relations is direct negotiations. Direct negotiations brought about Camp David, the Oslo accords and the Jordanian-Israeli agreements. The UN has sadly and consistently shown itself to be unhelpful to this process, largely because of its tilt toward the Arab side, as a result of the reality of power politics (Arab and Muslim numbers, wealth, resources, etc.) in the world body. In recent years the UN has shown some improvement concerning Israel's isolation, it is true, but certainly not enough to persuade anyone that is has a positive or balanced role to play in any aspect of the peace process.

In fact, Israel is still treated differently from all other UN member states. Though few know this, Israel has never been able to serve on the UN Security Council as one of the ten rotating (non-permanent) members of that body. Why? Because to serve, a country must be a member of a regional bloc (Asia, Africa, Latin America, West Europe, etc.). Israel's natural home is Asia but it has been denied admission from the outset. And Israel's efforts to gain temporary admission to the West European and Others Group (WEOG) have been to no avail because of opposition from France and several other European states.

Where does the AJC stand on these complex issues?

(a) We support the democratically elected government of Israel. That does not necessarily mean we must support every step taken by each and every government, but we profoundly respect the democratic process as an expression of the will of the Israeli people.

(b) We fully recognize that on matters related to Israel's security it is Israel, and Israel alone, that must decide what is in its own best interests. Others on the outside, no matter how well intentioned, need to exercise a certain restraint in suggesting what course(s) of action Israel ought to take.

(c) We support a peace process between Israel and her neighbors and have played a distinctive role as a non-governmental organization in developing ties in the Arab world to encourage that process and the normalization of relations with Israel and the Jewish people. To date, largely through the efforts of our Office of Government and International Affairs, supported by our Israel/Middle East Office, we have established productive working links with eleven Arab countries -- Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen -- and the Palestinian Authority.

(d) We have been seeking to develop enhanced ties with the Muslim community in the region, and here at home, consistent with our emphasis on interreligious understanding.

(e) We believe in the principle of direct negotiations between the parties involved, free of violence or the threat of violence. We appreciate the efforts of the United States, when and where appropriate, to facilitate those negotiations, and recognize the unique credentials the U.S. brings to the table.

(f) We believe in the importance of the U.S.-Israel partnership as a linchpin for stability in the region and the pursuit of peace, as well as a source of benefit to both countries in a wide variety of fields. Moreover, the significance of the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law are vital to a full appreciation of the U.S.-Israel parntership.

(g) It is the goal of AJC to do its utmost to strengthen understanding of Israel in the U.S. among this nation's key sectors, and to build support for Israel and the U.S.-Israel partnership.

(h)We should never lose sight of the larger strategic threats in the region nor should we hesitate to call attention to them. These include developments in such countries as Syria, Iraq and Iran, as well as the problematic involvement of Russia, Ukraine, China, North Korea and other outside parties in pursuing, principally for economic reasons, arms and technology markets in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

(i) Our national and chapter efforts to cultivate ongoing relations with the countries of Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa -- conducted on an unprecedented scope -- provide us with regular opportunities to exchange views on Israel, the Middle East, the peace process and regional strategic developments. This program remains an important agency priority.

For more information, or to contact American Jewish Committee, see their website at: www.ajc.org