Further Redeployment Netanyahu's Post-Hebron Dilemma

American Jewish Committee
Thursday, 9 January 1997

The ongoing stalemate between Israel and the PLO over a Hebron redeployment agreement no longer reflects any significant disagreement over Hebron itself. Rather, owing to the long delay over Hebron and the accompanying deterioration in Israeli-Arab relations, the focus is now on the demands made by Chairman Arafat that Israel pledge to carry out on schedule three "further redeployments" in the West Bank that are mandated by the Oslo agreements, and on Prime Minister Netanyahu's insistence that the issue not be mentioned in the Hebron agreement, or, alternatively, that changes be made in the further redeployment timetable. In turn, this controversy masks the very substantive issue of the territorial nature of a final settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. If and when Israel redeploys from Hebron, it is this territorial issue that will dominate the peace process.

This briefing examines the "further redeployment" controversy. It begins by looking at the wording of the agreements in question.

What the Agreements Say

The first Oslo agreement, signed in September 1993, stipulates that after the Gaza-Jericho withdrawal and the withdrawals involved in an Interim Agreement (Oslo II), "further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented...." However, "the two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period." The issues not to be prejudiced or preempted, and to be postponed for discussion in permanent status negotiations, include Jerusalem, settlements, borders and security. The timetable for the beginning of permanent status negotiations ("not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period") was May 4, 1996, and they are due to conclude within an additional three years, or by May 1999.

The Oslo II agreement, signed in September 1995, is far more specific regarding further redeployment. It stipulates that "further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the [elected Palestinian] Council ... to be completed within 18 months...." And "the two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council."

Elsewhere the agreement specifies that the further redeployments will be implemented "in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council," and that "the specified military locations ... will be determined in the further redeployment phases ... and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations." Several of these formulae are repeated twice, verbatim, in different parts of the agreement, for good measure.

The newly elected Council was inaugurated on March 9, 1996. Hence the date of the first of three further redeployments was to be September 9, 1996; the second would take place on March 9, 1997, and the third on September 9, 1997.

Thus the Oslo agreements determine that, after the Palestinian-populated areas of the West Bank (areas A and B) are turned over to the Palestinian Authority (what is commonly known as "Oslo II," wherein Hebron is the final parcel of territory to be turned over), Israel and the Palestinians are to embark on two parallel tracks. One, a negotiating track, discusses a final settlement, begins in May 1996 and ends by May 1999. The other, the further redeployment track, involves three unilateral Israeli withdrawals from areas B (Palestinian civil autonomy) and C (Israeli control) of the West Bank, beginning in September 1996 and ending a year later. While Israel is free to determine the scope of phases 1 and 2 of further redeployment, by the time it completes phase 3 it should have handed over to full Palestinian autonomy (area A) the entirety of the West Bank with the exception of "specified military locations," settlements, Jerusalem and any other relevant final status category that is discussed in the ongoing final settlement negotiations.

The Israeli drafters of the two Oslo agreements acquiesced in these formulations on the basis of two assumptions. First, they assumed that the term "specified military locations" was flexible enough to enable Israel to continue to hold on to territory on the West Bank that it might deem vital to retain in a final settlement, even if that territory did not contain a military base or a settlement. But at the same time, they assumed that Israel would indeed wish to turn over to the Palestinians under further redeployment most of the territory of the West Bank, and therefore there would be no serious contradiction between the further redeployment borders and the final settlement borders. Once the territorial question was more or less settled through the further redeployments, final status talks would concentrate on Jerusalem, the fate of the settlements left inside the Palestinian entity, the political nature of that entity (i.e., statehood or something else), the geopolitical nature of borders, and security demands regarding demilitarization, Israeli early warning stations and the Jordan River border.

Netanyahu's Dilemma

The Netanyahu government, which took office in mid-June 1996, "inherited" the Oslo timetables, in the sense that it undertook to carry out the Oslo agreements as Israeli treaty obligations. This is seen as Israel's sovereign duty under international law by the international community as well -- and especially by the United States, which is a signatory to the Oslo agreements. But Netanyahu has two key problems in dealing with the complex interlocking timetables outlined above.

First, from a procedural standpoint, Netanyahu inherited a process that was already behind schedule: Outgoing Prime Minister Peres had postponed the Hebron withdrawal from March 1996 until after the elections, then turned the issue over to Netanyahu. Peres had also inaugurated final status talks in a brief ceremony in May 1996, but it was clear to all that Netanyahu's election victory meant these would be postponed as well. Moreover, since Netanyahu has been preoccupied with Hebron for the past seven months, he has not had the time or the leisure to formulate a further redeployment strategy, much less a related concept of final status borders.

Netanyahu's second problem involves the substance of further redeployment/final status. To the extent that his views on a final settlement have been formulated, they appear to allow for a far smaller portion of the West Bank to be offered the Palestinians than Labor contemplated -- perhaps around 50 percent -- with Israel holding onto large portions of the greater Jerusalem region, the Jordan Valley and Judean Desert. It is virtually impossible to square this concept with the territorial transfers called for under further redeployment (everything but "agreed military locations" and settlements).

It is this dilemma that forms the backdrop to the current controversy over the Hebron agreement. Taking possession of Hebron is far less important for Arafat than ensuring Israeli compliance with the Oslo further redeployment clauses as he interprets them. The past seven months of stalemate have led him to doubt Netanyahu's credibility when it comes to the peace process, and what he knows of Netanyahu's plans for final status reinforces these doubts. The Hebron agreement, which Netanyahu wants, is thus seen as perhaps Arafat's last chance to oblige Netanyahu to carry out further redeployment on schedule and to offer the PLO a map of final status that more or less meets its minimal requirements.

Netanyahu has already undertaken to carry out phase 1 of further redeployment sometime in March 1997; since Israel unilaterally determines the scope of phases 1 and 2, phase 1 is likely to involve several small portions of Area C, possibly near Hebron, that will be turned over to the Palestinians as Area B. Beyond this, and in view of the current stalemate, he has several options. For one, he can reconfirm his commitment to the Oslo timetable as Arafat insists, but plan to carry out phases 2 and 3 of further redeployment on the basis of a claim that Israel's "specified military locations" actually occupy fully half the West Bank. Not only the Arab world, but many Israelis, the United States and the rest of the international community would probably argue that this definition is disingenuous, if not simply cynical.

Netanyahu could also agree to reconfirm the Oslo timetable, carry out phase 1, but continue to argue, as he has until now, that Palestinian lack of compliance with several controversial Oslo provisions -- extradition, unequivocal cancellation of the Covenant -- justify his refusing to comply with phases 2 and 3 of further redeployment. This tactic involves issues that the Palestinians argue they have complied with (and others argue that, to demand additional compliance is to present the Palestinians with demands they are incapable of carrying out). It also invites the Palestinians to insist on a number of issues in which Israel appears to be in violation of the Oslo provisions (e.g., release of prisoners, and "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank). Here too, this Israeli position would likely invite heavy international pressures, as well as claims within Israel and the Arab world that Netanyahu is fabricating issues with the aim of backing out of the process.

Finally, Netanyahu can maintain his current position. He can insist that if phases 2 and 3 of further redeployment are to be mentioned at all in the Hebron agreement, then they must be somehow adjusted to accommodate the realities of his situation. And he can argue that Arafat's insistence on mixing further redeployment issues with Hebron is unfair and unhelpful. After all, he has repeatedly pledged to honor Israel's Oslo commitments, and these include the original timetable.

Netanyahu is generally supported in this position by the American mediators led by Dennis Ross. They, along with Arafat's number two man, Abu Maazen, argue that Arafat is engaged in overkill. The very fact of a Likud government removing the IDF from Arab Hebron and carrying out phase 1 of further redeployment is so momentous, and so significant for Netanyahu's future engagement in the process, that Arafat should welcome it without delay and without further conditions. Besides, they note, considering the opposition within Netanyahu's current coalition, he can hardly be expected to make additional concessions at this point in time.

Arafat, for his part, is supported in his uncompromising stand by most of his advisers as well as by the Arab world, led by Egypt, which shares his lack of confidence in Netanyahu. Moreover, the course of the past half year has brought about a unique situation in which, for the first time, Arafat may be said to have the upper hand in his negotiations with Israel, and he is quite naturally pressing home his advantage. This explains his ability, thus far, to withstand American pressure. It also explains the U.S. attempt to substitute its own assurances to Arafat regarding Israeli observance of the further redeployment provisions, for those of Netanyahu.

To conclude, it has always been virtually axiomatic that the Israeli-Palestinian peace issues become more difficult as the process proceeds. Netanyahu has thus undertaken to deal with the truly difficult issues during his four year premiership. The current Hebron impasse was initially treated as a mere vestige -- however sensitive -- of the Rabin-Peres era. Now it has become a harbinger of things to come.

For more information, or to contact American Jewish Committee, see their website at: www.ajc.org